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FORGOITEN CONSTITUTIONAL IDSTORY: 
THE PRODUCTION AND MIGRATION OF 
MEANING WITHIN CONSTITUTIONAL 
CULTURES 
Gregory A. Mark* 
ARGUING AsoUT SLAVERY: THE GREAT BATTLE IN THE UNITED 
STATES CONGRESS. By William Lee Miller. New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf. 1996. Pp. 577. $35. 
FREE SPEECH IN lTs FORGOTTEN YEARS. By David M. Rabban. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 1997. Pp. xi, 404. $34.95. 
When was the last time you read a serious, recently published 
work of constitutional history that did not deal mainly with the 
work of the Supreme Court? When, even among those works, did 
the author look beyond the immediate litigants to give the reader a 
sense of an evolving constitutional culture - a culture in symbiosis 
with the larger political and social culture - its eddies and byways, 
as well as its mainstream? 
My strong hunch is that anyone who can triumphantly respond 
to the implicit condemnation of narrowness in these questions will 
do so in large measure having read either or perhaps both William 
Lee Miller's Arguing About Slavery1 and David Rabban's Free 
Speech in Its Forgotten Years.2 Both books explore unfamiliar con­
texts of familiar constitutional terms; both thereby enrich and un­
settle our complacent modem understanding of such terms; both 
should excite our historical imaginations and cause us to look for 
other untold or long-lost stories, which in tum might give us a more 
capacious and ironic understanding of constitutional institutions. 
What is more, both works tell us stories-ones with heroes and vil­
lains, themes of hope and betrayal, and, unfortunate as it may be, 
* Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School-Newark, and Member of the 
Graduate Faculty in History, Rutgers University-Newark. B.A. 1979, Butler; M.A. (History) 
1980, Harvard; J.D. 1988, University of Chicago. - Ed. Ariela Gross some time ago gave me 
extremely sage advice on writing about the history of the right to petition, and I want to take 
this opportunity to thank her for that advice. I am indebted to William Bratton, Sarah 
Gordon, Maxine Mark, and George Thomas for their co=ents. I would also like to thank 
Amy Miller for her timely assistance in preparing this review. 
1. William Lee Miller is Thomas C. Sorensen Professor of Political and Social Thought, 
University of Vrrginia. 
2. David Rabban is Thomas Shelton Maxey Professor, University of Texas School of Law. 
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endings that are not necessarily happy. Each book also can teach 
us about writing history. Each raises questions about the historian's 
method. What is more, read together, they put before us the deep­
est of questions regarding the construction of constitutional 
meaning. 
What is most interesting about each work, however, is some­
thing so obvious that it may easily be overlooked. These books are 
about political abstractions embodied in constitutional institutions, 
structured by our predecessors' reduction of those institutions to a 
few words on paper and succeeding generations' tortured fealty to 
those abstractions in the face of immediate, real-life, substantive 
pressures. For lawyers, each book therefore raises, implicitly at 
least, questions such as whether fealty should be to the precise his­
torical meaning of each clause, whether the values embodied in cer­
tain constitutional language may become irrelevant to later polities, 
and, even more confusing to lawyers, whether such values may be 
said to migrate from one given constitutional clause to another. 
Each book thus raises, without answering, the question of what in 
such abstractions can command loyalty and passion. 
THE STORIES3 
The constitutional institution at the center of Professor Miller's 
story is the right to petition for redress of grievances.4 As Professor 
Miller rightly notes, "[t]oday the right of petition looks rather pale 
beside those robust rights that have distinct constituencies, sharp 
disagreements, and sensational cases - freedom of the press, cer­
tainly, and religious liberty, and freedom of speech, or the cluster of 
rights in the middle articles of the Bill of Rights that protect the 
accused."5 In another era, however, when Congress, indeed the 
federal government itself, was deliberately left to its own devices in 
the malarial swamp from which the District of Columbia arose,6 the 
right to petition was thought, by some at least, to be a core constitu­
tional institution. It embodied a vision of fair and representative 
government, one in which all the people, individually and collec­
tively, could make governmental officials aware of their worries and 
3. Because the episode discussed by Miller antedates the controversies Rabban discusses, 
and for analytic reasons I develop in the last half of this review, it makes sense to discuss 
Miller's book before Rabban's. 
4. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." 
U.S. CoNST. amend. I (emphases added). 
5. Pp. 105-06; see also Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The History and 
Significance of the Right to Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 2153, 2155-57 & nn.2-5 (1998). 
6. See JAMES STERLING YOUNG, THE WASHINGTON COMMUNITY 1800-1828, at 13-37 
(1966). 
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difficulties, and could even propose solutions to their concerns. The 
people would do so in formal documents styled petitions, and, by 
taking up their grievances in such forms, the people could require 
the officials to take cognizance of those grievances. In an era when 
communication over time and distance was limited to documents 
and messengers, and when physical isolation was profound, the cen­
trality of such a device in a republican polity was palpable.7 
Antebellum America, however, was no idyll of com­
monwealthmen, as the book's very title suggests. The bitterly divi­
sive question of slavery hung in the background of American 
politics, especially of American constitutional politics, from the mo­
ment of the Founding forward, belying at a deep level the existence 
of a universal commonality of interest sufficient to keep all citizens 
united. Miller's story is the intersection of the constitutional insti­
tution which presupposed such a commonality and the institution of 
slavery. From the first federal Congress, antislavery petitions had 
been presented to the federal government. 8 At first they were cast 
in traditional petitionary form. They were measured, reasoned doc­
uments, formal prayers to legislators to take action where Congress 
could: to constrict the future reach of slavery, to eliminate it where 
Congress had the power, and to alter the Constitution to prohibit it 
entirely. Thus, as the country expanded westward, petitions vari­
ously sought to keep slavery from the territories, to condition those 
territories' statehood on its prohibition, and the like. For the Dis­
trict of Columbia itself, where the Congress functioned as landlord 
and town council, some prayers went so far as to request slavery's 
local prohibition.9 Gradually, as antislavery sentiment crystallized, 
as the arguments grew more precise, numerous, and pointed, so did 
the vehicle for their expression. Petitions grew less formal, their 
tone less civil. As prayers turned to demands, they became shorter. 
The less attention they were paid, the more numerous they 
became.10 
What had begun as a specific articulation by some Quakers and 
a vague disgust that existed at some level throughout the country 
became a political movement, rooted in religiously inspired moral­
ism (pp. 80-84), a movement not quite secular but not sectarian, and 
with an extraordinarily pronounced regional character. The aboli­
tion movement never succeeded in claiming all those who felt dis­
comfort with slavery. Its rhetoric was too radical, its adherents too 
7. See Mark, supra note 5, at 2161-212. 
8. See William C. cliGiacomantonio, "For the Gratification of a Volunteering Society": 
Antislavery and Pressure Group Politics in the First Federal Congress, 15 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 
169 {1995). 
9. See, e.g., p. 28. 
10. See Mark, supra note 5, at 2225-26. 
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eccentric in too many ways for that.11 Nonetheless, abolitionists 
grew in number and formed the vanguard of antislavery sentiment 
more generally. One of their political eccentricities - or at least an 
eccentricity of a large minority of abolitionists - was a willingness 
to countenance, at first simply as signatories on petitions, and later 
to encourage, as active speakers and circulators of petitions, women 
and free blacks to participate in abolitionists' work (though this en­
couragement ultimately split the movement). Quakers had, in their 
petitions to the early Congresses, allowed women signatories, but 
later abolitionists, some Quakers included, went much farther.12 
Chief among the tactics of abolitionists was a concerted attempt to 
keep antislavery at the forefront of American politics, and their 
chief vehicle was to petition Congress (pp. 107-12). The petition 
campaign was a conscious and sustained effort, suffused with moral­
ism, but a political campaign nonetheless. 
By the middle of the 1830s, slavery, which had bedeviled the 
workings of so many American institutions, thus collided with the 
constitutional institution of petition. A decade-long clash ensued in 
the Congress, more clearly and quietly in the Senate than in the 
House, but almost concurrently in both chambers. Southern sena­
tors, visibly irritated and insulted by the persistence of antislavery 
petitioning13 and at least vaguely fearing that the Senate's constant 
focus on slavery might actually result in tangible victories for anti­
slavery forces, 14 succeeded quickly and without much fanfare in 
having the Senate adopt a parliamentary device which automati­
cally responded negatively to antislavery petitions (p. 144). 
Southern representatives, who were no less irritated, insulted 
and fearful than their senatorial counterparts, achieved a much 
more hard-won success. What Miller does before telling the story 
of what was labeled the "gag-rule," the rule of the House barring 
reception of antislavery petitions, is to give enough background 
briefly to set the stage. We are reminded, to be sure, of the evolu­
tion of antislavery sentiment and abolitionism,15 but Miller quickly 
moves to personalities rather than social forces and movements. 
Young Southern representatives, perhaps egged on by the states­
men of the Senate,16 quickly rose to defend the honor of the South 
11. See 1 WILLIAM w. FREEHLING, THE ROAD TO DISUNION: SECESSIONISTS AT BAY 
1776-1854. at 290-95 (1990). 
12. See Deborah Bingham Van Broekhoven, "Let Your Names Be Enrolled": Method 
and Ideology in Women's Antislavery Petitioning, in THE ABoLmONIST SISTERHOOD: 
WoMEN's PoLmcAL CULTURE IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 179, 179-85 (Jean Fagan Yellin & 
'John C. Van Home eds., 1994). 
13. See, e.g., pp. 117-29. 
14. See FREEHLING, supra note 11, at 290-95. 
15. See, e.g., pp. 65-112. 
16. See, e.g., pp. 33-36. 
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from petitioners, hardly restrained by their more sage elders in the 
House. Why, however, was the victory so easily won in the Senate, 
yet so hard-won in the House? The difference may be summed up 
in one name: John Quincy Adams. 
Adams is the hero of Miller's story. Southern defenders of slav­
ery are the villains. No open abolitionist he,17 Adams was instead a 
man more deeply committed to an abstraction of liberty contained 
in the Constitution - the right of political participation and com­
munication as it was embodied in the ancient institution of petition 
(pp. 351-57). He fought the adoption of the gag-rule. He tested its 
contours at every opportunity.18 Before the gag-rule became a per­
manent rule of the House, he tried to introduce antislavery peti­
tions (p. 197); he tempted political fate by attempting to query the 
Speaker of the House concerning a "petition from twenty:-two per­
sons, declaring themselves to be slaves" (p. 230); he was subjected 
to cries and motions to censure him;19 and he led the fight for the 
gag-rule's repeal. In these efforts he was joined by some, though 
not many, constitutional traditionalists and a slowly growing 
number of antislavery Congressmen. 
Miller gives us an almost day-to-day recitation of the events as 
they unfolded from the gag's adoption in 1836 until its repeal in 
1844. Along the way he takes time for some excursions into related 
matters. He briefly discusses the role of women in the petition 
campaign,2° the struggles within the political parties, including 
those based on slavery,21 the nature of antebellum Protestantism,22 
and other related topics. But, overwhelmingly, Miller's is a story of 
personality and conflict - Adams and allies, at first laid low, later 
triumphant (pp. 476-79). Adams, the hero, collapses in the House 
and dies within days, only a few years after the gag's repeal (pp. 
458-59). Waddy Thompson, one of Adams's young antagonists, 
overreaching in the attempt to censure Adams, ultimately gone 
from the House at the gag's repeal, "[h]e would lose his fortune in 
the Civil War - and (would it be proper to add?) would then be to 
historical memory one of the obscurest of the obscure Whigs. Fare­
well to Waddy Thompson" (p. 478). 
Despite his brief excursions into related matters, Miller's focus 
on personality dominates his interpretation of history. Slavery is 
17. Freehling describes him as "a closet abolitionist," see FREEHLING, supra note 11 at 
259, and "not publicly an abolitionist," id. at 342. 
18. The most recent scholarly treatment is David C. Frederick, John Quincy Adams, Slav-
ery, and the Disappearance of the Right to Petition, 9 L. & HIST. REv. 113 (1991). 
19. See, e.g., pp. 42944. 
20. See, e.g., pp. 48, 110-11. 
21. See, e.g., pp. 375-87. 
22. See, e.g., pp. 80-89. 
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largely reduced to nothing but a moral question, rather than an 
amalgam of class, racial, economic, religious, and other factors, in­
cluding the moral one, making the creation of heroes (and villains) 
easier. Similarly - and more importantly from the perspective of 
legal and constitutional scholars, historians, and others - the insti­
tution of petitioning in Miller's account is equally unidimensional. 
Other than the claims of the constitutional traditionalists in the 
House who felt that the right had been abridged, we are left won­
dering what it was about the right to petition that inspired Adams 
and his small band of brothers, and what it was that failed of respect 
where so many others were concerned. We learn that the right to 
petition was "sacred," but its sanctity rings hollow to us, not simply 
because we do not regard petitioning as central to our political life, 
but also because Miller's treatment of petitioning imbues it with so 
little political and moral content, as contrasted with the unalloyed 
moralism of his analysis of slavery. We are thus left wondering 
what Adams was really doing, what informed his belief in petition­
ing. Miller's focus on personality at the expense of richer context 
thus has the perverse effect of making both his heroes and villains 
less complex, thus more prone to being, respectively, undermined 
or rehabilitated by those who know the institutional details. Such 
details would transform the historical roles of the participants from 
mere moralists to men of varying and nuanced moralities, morali­
ties tempered by the vices forced on them by historical circum­
stance. While, for example, moral opposition to slavery is easy to 
understand, loyalty to the right to petition may seem merely eccen­
tric or quixotic without such details. 
While Professor Miller's book reopens the story of a forgotten 
constitutional institution, Professor Rabban tells us a forgotten 
story about a very familiar institution and upsets some constitu­
tional iconography along the way. The traditional story of free 
speech is that, with the exception of some incidents of suppression 
associated with the Alien and Sedition Acts in the waning years of 
the eighteenth century, free speech entered into our constitutional 
consciousness almost ex nihilo in the early twentieth century. 
World War I and its attendant suppression of pacifist, socialist, or 
otherwise seemingly suspicious speech spurred a reluctant Supreme 
Court to action.23 Aided by Zechariah Chafee's pioneering schol­
arship,24 Justices Brandeis and Holmes led the Court into the pro­
tection of political speech which, decades later, the Warren Court 
23. See, e.g., ALFRED H. KELLY, ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND ITS ORIGINS 
& DEVELOPMENT 140-41, 526-27 (6th ed. 1983). 
24. See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1920); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., 
Freedom of Speech, 17 NEw REPUBLIC 66 (1918); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech 
in War Time, 32 HAR.v. L. REv. 932 (1919). 
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broadened into protection of cultural expression more generally (p. 
1). Wrong, says Rabban. Not just wrong, but perniciously so. 
For decades before World War I, Rabban reveals, individuals 
and organizations pursuing a wide range of ends sought protection 
for their speech when harassed and prosecuted. Proponents of cul­
tural transformation - including advocates of such scandalous 
objectives as sexual freedom and birth control (pp. 27-44), defend­
ers of organized labor (pp. 77-125), and others - all made claims 
that their expression was protected. Their faith, or at least the faith 
they articulated, like that of Adams before them, was an an abstrac­
tion rendered by writing into a constitutional institution: freedom of 
speech.25 And, like Adams, they had to wait, but not for a decade 
- rather, they had to wait for half a century or more before their 
faith was rewarded. 
These cultural friends of free speech waited because the execu­
tive branch, the traditional organ suspicious of eccentric public ex­
pression, was abetted by a legislature with powerful conformist and 
seemingly majoritarian political impulses,26 and by a judiciary that 
refused to read the First Amendment as anything but a supercodifi­
cation of common law doctrines limiting prior restraint (pp. 132-
46). All branches of government did what they did at least in part 
because the speakers were culturally marginal, their speech all the 
more so. They articulated concerns not just eccentric, but eccentric 
in ways perceived as antithetical to what was proper in a good soci­
ety.27 The judiciary, in the traditional story, thus broke ranks when 
Holmes and Brandeis, influenced by Chafee, redefined the First 
Amendment to protect political speech, carving out an exception in 
the pattern of suppression (p. 1). 
However laudable the creation of that toehold for free speech, 
Rabban tells us that it was based in error, probably willful error. 
Rabban's most interesting subtale is his reconstruction, and conse­
quent destruction, of Chafee's seminal articles in which Chafee at­
tributed to Holmes an interpretation of the Free Speech Clause that 
Holmes never intended. Rabban says Chafee willfully read 
Holmes's opinion in Schenck v. United States28 as narrowing the 
doctrine of prior restraint with its "clear and present danger" lan­
guage when, in fact, no evidence for such a reading exists and much 
contradictory evidence abounds (pp. 322-26). Why, then, did 
25. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of 
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of griev­
ances." U.S. CoNST. amend. I (emphases added). 
26. See, e.g., pp. 249-56. 
27. See, e.g., pp. 28, 252. 
28. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
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Holmes go along with Chafee? Something more than the mutual 
loyalty of Harvard men must have been at stake. 
Rabban notes that Holmes maintained that his analysis of free 
speech was consistent from long before Schenck until long after 
(pp. 346-47, 355). Rabban convincingly demonstrates othenvise. 
Nonetheless, he only skirts the edges of speculation about what 
might have motivated the change (p. 350). Chafee, through the 
good offices of Harold Laski, actually met with Holmes in the 
months before Holmes began to shift his views (pp. 353-54). 
Rabban is careful not to conclude that Chafee then, or at any other 
time, changed Holmes's mind. Nor does Rabban conclude that 
others who criticized Holmes for an astringent understanding of 
free speech, notably Ernst Freund of the University of Chicago Law 
School,29 persuaded him of error. Nor, as Holmes made clear pri­
vately (p. 356), did he suddenly develop an appreciation for popular 
political discourse. We are allowed to infer, however, that Holmes 
was not beyond being influenced, and that the considered opinion 
of other learned members of the legal and political elite had its ef­
fect - not, perhaps, as pure persuasion, but as an indication that at 
least some of the speech at issue might be that of persons not quite 
so culturally marginal as generally supposed (pp. 346-49). Even if 
Holmes still viewed much of this speech as that of "an ass . . . 
drool[ing] about proletarian dictatorship" (p. 356), the fact that 
others of his ilk felt the drool worth defending may have led him to 
acknowledge that defense of speech, at least of political speech, had 
moved away from the periphery and somewhat closer to the core of 
respectability and acceptance. Indeed, that he even felt it incum­
bent to mention his defense of the right suggests that he was sensi­
tive to the attention being paid to free speech. 
Thus, like Miller, Rabban finds two groups of heroes. Free 
speech plaintiffs and their lawyers, like antislavery petitioners 
before them, exercised their rights and did so from the very margins 
of society. Their defenders - Adams, Brandeis, Hand, and the 
condescending Holmes - by their defense lent legitimacy to a 
broader understanding of the utility of tolerance and the demo­
cratic value of speech. Nonetheless, Rabban, like Miller, has cast 
his story in traditional terms: interest groups whose interests are 
best exemplified by important personalities. 
Why did the plaintiffs believe in the right in the first place? I 
doubt very much that every birth control advocate, every defender 
of organized labor, and every other speaker of the unacceptable 
shared Thomas Cooley's rejection of the Blackstonian notion that 
the Free Speech Clause merely set out the governing common law 
29. See Ernst Freund, The Debs Case and Freedom of Speech, 19 NEW REPUBLIC 13 
(1919), reprinted in 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 239 (1973). 
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on prior restraint (pp. 177, 192). Holmes's curious metaphor, "the 
marketplace of ideas," also fails to capture the faith with which ad­
herents of bad, losing, eccentric, unpopular, and sometimes genu­
inely pernicious ideas pursued them then and pursue those ideas 
even today; nor is the marketplace metaphor particularly apt for 
those who genuinely believe in free communication, even when 
they regard the content as drivel, or worse. Indeed, is there any 
evidence other than the tautological for the notion that the measure 
of the worth of an idea is its acceptance? Something deeper in the 
culture was at work; something deeper motivated generations of 
cultural radicals to keep articulating free speech claims in the face 
of the hostility of the courts. In contrast with Miller, who leaves us 
to wonder about the motivations of the constitutional traditionalists 
who defended the right to petition, Rabban links the right of free 
speech to the belief of libertarian radicals in "the primary value of 
individual autonomy against the power of church and state" (p. 23). 
Rabban argues that desire for such autonomy was what led its pro­
ponents and defenders to go to such lengths on behalf of an abstrac­
tion. General autonomy rationales, however, tend to lose out when 
weighed against immediate and keenly felt threats to more concrete 
interests. 
RECASTING THE STORIES 
For the record, I am among those who hold to that faith in the 
value of free communication. Nonetheless, as with all faiths, the 
empirical support for the utility and virtue of free communication is 
thin, at best. (I hasten to add, however, that the empirical support 
for those who would limit speech in the name of the larger good has 
always struck me as equally, if not more, thin.) What might we 
gain, however, if we read both Miller and Rabban somewhat uncon­
ventionally, recasting their works sympathetically but doing so in 
ways consonant with the themes of their works? We need not read 
Miller as simply a story about antislavery forces clashing with 
Southern interests, the petitioners against the slavocracy. We might 
instead read it as one about an abstraction - the right to petition 
- pitted against concrete interests, those of slavery. Similarly, we 
need not read Rabban simply as a story about culturally marginal 
agitators battling a conformist majority personified in a hostile judi­
ciary. We may, rather, view it as a story about proponents of an 
abstraction - the right of free speech - pitted against the interests 
of a polity weakly committed to this abstraction but led by a gov­
erning group intensely interested in the preservation of an estab­
lished order. I do not mean to suggest that this is not already a 
component of the stories both authors tell, though it is a much 
greater part of Rabban's story than of Miller's. But even in 
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Rabban's work, the story of the autonomy rationale as the basis for 
a free speech faith sometimes sounds, as Rabban would be among 
the first to admit, a bit self-serving (pp. 381-93). We also know that 
all too often proponents of their own autonomy have precious little 
respect for autonomy claims of others.30 
The theoretical implications for the First Amendment of won­
dering about the historical force of constitutional abstractions are 
clear. Every time the government seeks to suppress petitioners or 
speakers, it does so claiming that the greater good will be protected. 
Southerners trumpeted the gag-rule not just as a protection for 
Southern honor and interests,31 but as a protection of the Union 
and the interests of a united and strong America.32 Legal tradition­
alists claimed that the "bad tendency" test allowed for punishment 
of speech that led to social unrest, riot, division of the classes, and 
difficulties in the conduct of military policy.33 In every case the 
claims were, if not true, at least plausible and difficult to refute. 
Arrayed against claims of specific dangers, specific harms, and 
palpable injury were the necessarily inchoate interests of freedom 
and rights, abstractions removed from the concerns of those af­
fected by their exercise. Modern political theorists of the public 
choice school have a powerful reason for suggesting that this read­
ing renders the subsequent course of events implausible. According 
to such theorists, abstract and inchoate interests tend to lose to spe­
cific interests because attachment to more general concerns tends 
to be weaker, thinner, and more diffuse than attachment to specific 
interests. Hence we should not expect, the argument goes, a gen­
eral public expression of belief in free speech, the right to petition, 
or any other equivalent claim, to be able to hold up against the 
concentrated and passionate claims of groups with specific ratio­
nales for limiting such freedoms, especially when they can point to 
immediate injuries and can conjure others. 
Nonetheless, we know that both the right to petition and the 
freedom of speech, not the slavocracy and repressive cultural inter­
ests who used the federal government as their tool, ultimately tri­
umphed. Why? Let us indulge a very simple public choice thought 
experiment grounded in these books. These works suggest at least 
two aspects of constitutional culture that deserve to be addressed 
from both historical and theoretical perspectives. First, it may be 
that our constitutional culture has created, and is itself a product of, 
30. One thinks, in recent American history, of Nazi marchers in Skokie, Illinois, for ex­
ample, or those who confiscate right-wing college newspapers, or violent antiabortion protes­
tors who make full use of the panoply of available constitutional rights. 
31. See, e.g., p. 127. 
32. See, e.g., pp. 128-29. 
33. See, e.g., pp. 276-78. 
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a set of expectations about the conduct of government that is con­
tinually reinforced and strengthened by challenges to those expec­
tations. That is, the general interest in the exercise of constitutional 
rights gives way to momentary specific interests, but, over time, the 
general interest outlives the specific interest and wins out, stronger 
and more resilient for the exercise. In other words, our constitu­
tional culture may develop something like antibodies, to use an un­
fortunate analogy. Nonetheless, even that hypothesis does not 
really address the position advanced by the public choice theorists. 
The general and diffuse claim should still be defeated by the spe­
cific claim and should have no reason to rise again, since every so­
cial and political moment gives rise to reasons to limit expression. 
In the case of the gag-rule, a Southern minority with an intense 
attachment to slavery overcame a weak majoritarian attachment to 
the right to petition. The right to petition had, after all, lost its cen­
trality as a means of political participation, and the Southerners 
were careful to conjure dangers that might arise from petitioning -
such as dissolution of the Union - that could actually rouse 
majoritarian fears. Furthermore, Southerners did their level best to 
separate the general institution of petitioning from its use by the 
most socially marginal petitioners, women and free blacks, whom 
they attacked with special virulence, ignoring - if they even knew 
it - petition's own history as the universal means of political par­
ticipation. The gag was defeated, however, not as a result of the 
rise of pro-petition sentiment within the voting public, but rather as 
a result of the rise of an amalgam of political sentiments, including 
antislavery and sectional identification, among voters. Nonetheless, 
with the defeat of the gag-rule, public identification with expressive 
rights turned the prior efforts to stifle petitions into something with 
which to tar proslavery politicians. 
Thus, the general claim for free expression persists, eclipsed but 
not defeated. Because it continues to exist as a social icon, it stands 
in opposition to the more specific claim even while in eclipse. It 
continues to resist and eventually, when the specific claim fades 
away, apparently emerges stronger than at the outset. This, then, is 
the second proposition worth exploring: that general support for 
free expression is not itself actually challenged. 
Both Miller and Rabban provide some evidence for the second 
proposition. Miller's is quite emphatic - Southern representatives 
never actually attacked the right to petition, though a few made 
light of it,34 even in the face of the continued rear-guard actions of 
John Quincy Adams in the House. When the proslavery 
34. "Hitherto we have been fighting about mere abstractions. Hitherto we have been 
contending about the right of petition, and other minor and unimportant points." 12 CoNG. 
DEB. 2494 (1836) (statement of Rep. Pinckney of South Carolina). 
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Representatives were dismissive, it counted against them (p. 106� . 
Rabban's evidence is somewhat different. He shows that a wide 
variety of individuals and groups continually advanced free speech 
claims, claims they - or at least their lawyers - must have known 
were extreme long-shots at best, last-ditch desperation arguments 
at worst, given established doctrine and opinion. Nonetheless, the 
arguments were made. What is more remarkable, however, is the 
response that the arguments made by the believers in free speech 
and petition engendered. 
At first glance Rabban's work seems at odds with the premise of 
the thought experiment. The cultural dissidents were the minority, 
after all, and they captured nothing, certainly not the institutions of 
government. But the premise of the thought experiment is the gen­
eral but relatively weak public attachment to the right of free 
speech. The interest group that captured the government therefore 
would be an elite defending an established order out of fear that the 
cultural dissidents might gain majoritarian sympathy and alter that 
order. (Certainly not all of the dissidents fit the pattern, but even if 
birth control advocates, for example, were unlikely to capture 
majoritarian support, those in control of the government linked 
them to causes with such potential if in no other way than through 
parallel forms of suppression.) The elite defending the order was 
itself, after all, a form of minority interest group. The emergence of 
free speech as a protected right came about not when the general 
public demanded it, but rather when members of the elite them­
selves saw instrumental value in certain dissident expression, and 
then only for speech that embodied that instrumental value. 
Opponents of antislavery petitions and of the expression of cul­
tural and political dissidents were generally, though not universally, 
careful to portray themselves as not opposed to the exercise of the 
right to petition or the exercise of free speech either generally or in 
the abstract. Usually, in fact, their tactics often explicitly amounted 
to characterizing the exercise of either right as an abuse of the right 
or as something other than its exercise in the first place. Such at­
tempts to isolate and distinguish the contested exercise from the 
abstraction thus allowed them to proclaim their continued support 
of the abstraction (p. 13). 
These proclamations, even if they were - as they must have 
been in at least a few cases - nothing but lip service to the consti­
tutional abstractions, were at least uttered. And they must have 
been uttered for a reason. Those proclaiming such fealty believed, 
they must have believed, that they would pay a political price for 
actually articulating opposition to free petition or speech. Further­
more, they must have felt that such a price was too high to bear in 
their support of more specific claims, even if the price was not very 
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high as an absolute matter. It was a relatively cheap political align­
ment to support the abstraction, relatively costly to oppose it. 
No matter how thin the actual support for the abstract rights, 
however, the salient point is that individuals who opposed particu­
lar exercises of the right to petition or of free speech felt that they 
had something to gain by noting their support for the rights in the 
abstract. Of course, the corollary is that an appreciative public 
stood ready to hear such support (p. 13), indeed may have required 
it in order to entertain the claim that an exception should be made 
to the more general right or to listen to a claim that a particular act 
was not covered by the protection of such rights. Crudely put, no 
one has ever won an election in this country by running against 
freedom, at least in the abstract. In other countries, however, (and 
the twentieth century is littered with examples) politicians pay no 
price or may even curry electoral success with such opposition.35 
Such speculation may demonstrate the persistence of a public 
constitutional culture resting on a belief in a set of abstractions, 
such as rights to petition and free speech. It does not, however, 
deal with the larger issue of how the specific interests challenging 
the particular expressions of the abstract rights evaporate. That is 
the other side of the public choice explanation - since the general 
belief, if it is only weakly held, cannot actually defeat the specific 
claim, the latter must itself lose support if the general belief is to 
come out on top. The explanation is, at least in part - as exempli­
fied in these two works - that interest groups come and interest 
groups go. That is, minority interest groups that must capture the 
political structure to achieve their goals must strike deals with other 
minority interest groups, a la Madison in Federalist No. 10. When 
such alliances collapse, the interests of any particular minority are 
vulnerable, even to a rather weakly supported majoritarian posi­
tion. Alternatively, the minority interest group must either disap­
pear or become so marginal that it is unable to enforce its single­
minded will on a majority with a set of diffuse and therefore weaker 
concerns. In either case, the story of collapse or decline is contextu­
ally specific. The decline of a proslavery group in Congress able to 
enforce its will on the rest is both a story of lost allies and marginal­
ization. By 1844 the proslavery representatives had lost key allies 
in the House for a wide variety of political and other reasons (pp. 
477-79). They were thus unable to muster the majority necessary to 
maintain the repressive gag-rule. The decline of strength in the 
House is, however, merely description and not explanation. It only 
describes membership in the House and does not itself explain the 
35. See, e.g., Stephen F. Cohen, "Transition" Is a Motion Rooted in U.S. Ego, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 27, 1999, at B7; Lee Hochstader, Once Upon a Ruble, Ah, Life Was Grand; Nostalgia 
Feeding Communist Comeback, WASH. PoST, Nov. 12, 1995, at A27. 
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underlying political shift. At least in part, the proslavery forces, in­
cluding the House members themselves, helped to marginalize 
themselves by their continued support of the gag-rule (pp. 479-80). 
It was an issue in some of the campaigns for the House. While not 
central, perhaps, it played a role in demonizing proslavery senti­
ment and mobilizing a political center wary of the extreme claims 
made by the firebrand Southerners (p. 484). 
The triumph of cultural proponents of free speech is at least as 
thickly contextual and more elongated than the decline of support 
for the gag-rule. The movements for sexual freedom, birth control, 
organized labor, pacifism, socialism, anarchism, and many others 
that Rabban notes as intimately connected to the history of free 
speech have been the subject of almost countless books and articles 
themselves. Nothing would be gained (and much lost) to sketch out 
here the history of any of these movements in this country, except 
to note the obvious: each has a rich and complex history, one in 
which success or failure cannot be measured by electoral margins in 
the House (or in any political body or bodies) but which must be 
measured by acceptance, often co-optation, of ideas. By most 
measures, therefore, all but socialism and pacifism have been suc­
cessful, and even socialism and pacifism have achieved victories, 
both political and programmatic.36 
None of this is to say, however, that the successes of such move­
ments were expedited by the crude attempts at repression charac­
teristic of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. What 
may be true, however, is that such repressive efforts created a pe­
riphery of expression the suppression of which opened up a core of 
speech, political speech, that could - by the very creation of pe­
riphery and core - more easily be defended under the Free Speech 
Clause. Rabban's graceful explanation of the role of progressive 
political and social theorists is crucial in understanding the creation 
of that core and worth quoting at some length. 
Originally, 
[t]he progressive position [was] that individual rights should be recog­
nized only to the extent that they contribute to social interests[, and 
this position] applied in principle to speech as well as to liberty of 
contract. Pound explicitly acknowledged this point when he justified 
balancing social interests in free speech against competing social in­
terests in the security of state institutions. The commitment of 
progressives to the creation of a harmonious community also limited 
36. Indeed, some conservative thinkers believe that socialism has achieved full-blown 
progra=atic victories. See, e.g., MILTON & RosE FRIEDMAN, FREE To CHoosB 311-12 
(1980) (reprinting the Socialist Platform of 1928 and noting that virtually all of its provisions 
have been at least partially implemented in some form). While the pacifist movement has 
seemed hopelessly utopian, treaty restrictions on the size of naval vessels and on the use of 
chemical and biological weapons are examples of successful measures motivated by the hor­
ror of war. 
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their conception of free speech. While often recognizing the social 
value of criticism, progressives ignored and occasionally condemned 
dissent that did not contribute to the community. 
The dual commitment of progressives to critical inquiry and com­
munity harmony created a tension at the core of their attitudes about 
free speech . . . .  
Progressive intellectuals frequently invoked the value of critical 
inquiry in science as a model for democratic life . . . .  
The tension between critical inquiry and community harmony, evi­
dent even in the limited realm of scientific theory, became exacer­
bated as progressives extended the model of science to social issues 
and had enormous implications for the role of free speech in a democ­
racy. [pp. 212-14] 
On Rabban's understanding, therefore, before World War I com­
munity harmony, structured along the ideals propounded by the 
progressives, dominated their own interest in critical inquiry. 
World War I was a catalyst in transforming the views of the progres­
sives. The Espionage Act, and prosecutions commenced under its 
authority, moved the progressive center from complacency about 
critical inquiry to concern. As Rabban put it, 
Many progressive publicists, who had eagerly joined the Wilson ad­
ministration and supported the war effort, became increasingly con­
cerned about the repression of speech during and especially after the 
war . . . .  
The [emergence of modem First Amendment doctrine] reflected 
the continuing influence of progressive ideology and the debate over 
antiwar speech during which [it] developed. It is most striking that 
the postwar civil libertarians essentially limited the protection of the 
First Amendment to political expression. [pp. 302-03; footnotes 
omitted] 
The progressive intellectual capacity first to create the tension be­
tween inquiry and community, and then to shift the balance from 
community to inquiry while retaining the dichotomy, effectively 
created a core of speech to be protected and a periphery that could 
be legitimately compromised. The progressives could thus simulta­
neously engage in a doctrinal revision, co-opt a libertarian streak in 
free speech rhetoric, and legitimate that position by leaving an 
"other," the repression of which they, along with a conformist ma­
jority, approved. 
The progressive volte face highlights the final theoretical ques­
tion raised by these books. For constitutional lawyers the question 
raises issues which may be extremely problematic. For constitu­
tional historians used to exploring the changing meaning of text 
through the vehicle of court cases, it may be unsettlingly revisionist. 
For cultural and intellectual historians, however, it may be old hat. 
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Simply put, each book subtly asks whether what are today called 
"constitutional values," especially "First Amendment values," may 
not have been embodied in different bits of constitutional text over 
time. The books, especially taken together, suggest that such values 
may migrate from one clause to another, even within the same 
amendment, as the physical, social, and political circumstances of 
the country change. 
Political speech may have actually been at the very core of First 
Amendment values all along. Indeed, Rabban makes such a claim 
(p. 13). The Founders, drawing on their experience and the vicari­
ous experience of colonial and English history as they learned it, 
may very well have understood that political expression is founda­
tional in any political culture dependent on participation by those 
outside an oligarchy. They no doubt believed that a certain breadth 
of political participation was necessary legitimately to ground their 
claims that this country's political institutions rested in popular sov­
ereignty. They certainly claimed that they valued public commen­
tary on the actions of the government. How, then, could political 
speech not be at the core of the First Amendment? 
Rabban's reference to the progressives' idyllic vision of critical 
inquiry is telling. Not for them the hurly burly of an open and 
schismatic politics. Rather, criticism was originally to serve com­
munitarian political ends. But, of course, the ordered and struc­
tured politics of community was not just a progressive vision. It was 
also a vision of the Founders. The vehicle for pure political speech 
at the Founding, at least the one which had a historical pedigree, 
was not the Speech or the Press Clause, but rather the Petition 
Clause, the clause at the center of Miller's work. Free speech as a 
distinct legal right, by contrast, was in its infancy. For most of Eng­
lish and much of colonial history, the right to petition protected and 
ensured the broadest popular access to the organs and officers of 
government,37 so long as the communication was formally stated3B 
and politely, that is, deferentially, phrased.39 In this way political 
complaints served to reinforce rather than divide the political com­
munity. One of the stories - largely untold - of the late eight­
eenth and the early nineteenth centuries is the erosion of the 
petition as the primary vehicle for political expression and political 
expression's subsequent democratic reincarnation in the Speech 
and Press Clauses. 
This migration of protection for political speech from petition to 
speech and press is but one form of the disruptive migration of 
meaning within constitutional culture that historians are now un-
37. See Mark, supra note 5, at 2161-91. 
38. See id. at 2170-74. 
39. See id. at 2165, 2186 & n.146. 
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covering. In another sphere - for example, the separation of pow­
ers - one thinks of the innovative work of Christine Desan on 
eighteenth-century legislative adjudication.40 Such migrations dis­
rupt a lawyer's search for continuity in constitutional meaning and 
remind historians who trace back the history of portions of texts 
that they should be keenly aware of anachronism. Read together, 
Miller and Rabban have provided the legal and historical communi­
ties with wonderful new lenses through which to understand the 
nineteenth-century disruption and transformation of the constitu­
tional culture and meaning of free expression. 
Perhaps most important of all, the works remind us that there 
was a constitutional history in the nineteenth century, but to un­
cover it we must often look in unfamiliar places, not contenting our­
selves with received wisdom and twentieth-century categories of 
doctrine and structure. One implicit component of the received 
wisdom is that the nineteenth century was a century of relative 
peace as far as constitutional rights litigation is concemed41 and 
that the forays of federal courts into the arena, notably in Dred 
Scott v. Sandford42 and Lochner v. New York43 (which is regarded 
as a nineteenth-century case in spite of its year of decision), suggest 
that the quietude may have been a good thing. Perhaps the conven­
tional view is correct in that we did have to wait for Holmes and 
Brandeis, even for the Warren Court, before we could have the 
constitutional culture of which we are generally so proud today. 
Rabban and Miller, however, offer us a counterthesis, if we just 
know where to look. 
Where might we look? Rabban and Miller implicitly offer use­
ful suggestions. Miller's work suggests that we should look to other 
institutions of government, especially the Congress, to understand 
how fundamental rights were viewed.44 Moreover, it also suggests 
that we look not just to other institutions, but other clauses of the 
Constitution as well. One example comes immediately to mind 
from the same era Miller explores. In addition to the petition cam­
paign, abolitionists attempted to send pamphlets throughout the 
country, and especially into the South. The Post Office - really, 
postmasters - intercepted many of the pamphlets and refused to 
deliver them.45 This, of course, amounted to censorship. So far as I 
40. See Christine A. Desan, The Constitutional Commitment to Legislative Adjudication 
in the Early American Tradition, 111 HARV. L. REv. 1381 (1998). 
41. Rabban makes that point explicitly about free speech. P. 1. 
42. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
43. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
44. Of course, Miller is neither unique nor novel in this regard. James Willard Hurst long 
ago made such a suggestion, both explicitly and implicitly in his own work. See JAMES Wn..­
LARD HURST, THE GROWIH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS (1950). 
45. See FREEHLING, supra note 11, at 291-92, 309-10. 
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know, this episode is little mentioned in the literature of legal his­
tory, despite its parallels to late nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
Post Office restrictions on the use of the mails for obscene and 
other forms of literature. Why do we know so little of this episode? 
Can the explanation be simply that no memorable litigation 
ensued? 
Similarly, we know that state constitutions contained clauses 
parallel to those found in the Bill of Rights and elsewhere in the 
Constitution. Despite a burst of enthusiasm for state constitutional 
protections that ensued as federal courts retreated from the pro­
gressive constitutionalism of the Warren Court, we know surpris­
ingly little about state constitutional history, especially about how 
such rights clauses fared in state courts in the nineteenth century.46 
Indeed, the story may be that no litigation at all was grounded in 
such clauses. That is generally what we think, but do we think so 
simply because next to no serious work has been done on such ac­
tions? Perhaps, like so much other nineteenth-century litigation, 
records remain unpublished. To uncover such stories, perhaps we 
need simply to dig deeper, as William Treanor has done even on the 
well-covered ground of the power to declare war47 (among other 
topics). Perhaps as Miller suggests, we should look to other institu­
tions to see how constitutional meaning evolved. Perhaps, as Rab­
ban does, we should just look a little further back in the Decennial 
and Century Editions of the American Digest and not look at such 
indices through the blinders of what is taken as the final word on 
the subject.48 
David Hackett Fischer some years ago catalogued the profes­
sional sins of historians in Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of 
Historical Thought. Fischer was professionally generous and did 
not criticize lawyers for their failings as historians. Lawyers as well 
as professional historians are, however, guilty of the worst forms of 
what he termed the "fallacy of presentism"49 and the "fallacy of 
tunnel history."50 No one can, of course, deny that at least some of 
the reason we study the past is to secure meaning for ourselves in 
the present. Nor, of course, can anyone present all of history in one 
gulp. Rabban and Miller, however, enlarge and expand our recog­
nition of much, though admittedly not all, of the context and 
choices available to the historical actors. They are conscious that 
46. Our knowledge is at its thinnest in the antebellum period. 
47. See William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to Declare War, 82 
CORNELL L. REv. 695 (1997). 
48. Rabban looked at state cases dealing with speech in addition to uncovering lost schol­
arship and popular advocacy. P. 19. 
49. DAVID HACKEIT FISCHER, HISTORIANS' FALLACIES: TOWARD A Lome OF HISTORI· 
CAL THOUGHT 135-40 (1970). 
50. Id. at 142-44. 
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what they write may,. perhaps ought to, affect our current constitu­
tional culture. In so doing they raise historiographical questions of 
the first order. 
Rabban, in fact, deliberately raises many questions of interpre­
tation of the history of ideas in the opening of his work (pp. 9-12, 
17-19, 21), though his is otherwise a very conventional monograph. 
It is, therefore, a very important book for the story it tells and for 
what he has uncovered, not so much for the methodology he em­
ploys. He is correct, however, that many theoretical options pres­
ent themselves, quite temptingly in some cases, to a modem 
historian. Indeed, something of a generational divide exists in the 
historical community. One need only sit in on a colloquium dedi­
cated to the study of history to hear the different voices. Graduate 
students and newly minted Ph.Ds. speak, among other things, the 
language of literary criticism and are eager to apply it to historical 
sources. Whether that application will, in and of itself, expose lay­
ers of meaning that have gone unseen by older generations of schol­
ars is an open question. I understand that Rabban intends to 
explore that very topic in future work on intellectual historiogra­
phy. He notes that "[m]any scholars warn that an idea can have 
such radically different meanings for different people that any at­
tempt to analyze it as a coherent subject is doomed to failure" (p. 
9). Rabban apparently rejects such a conclusion - after all, the 
book continues for nearly four hundred more pages in an attempt 
to give coherent meaning to an episode of constitutional history -
while accepting the clear reality of contingent meanings and multi­
ple interpretations. I believe he is correct in his operating assump­
tions. Few, if any, interpretations are definitive, but many are more 
persuasive and enlightening than others. The more successful the 
interpretation, in my experience at least, the more one can count on 
the author having asked fundamental questions and having revis­
ited original materials or visited materials previously unknown. 
That all knowledge is partial hardly defeats the claim that one inter­
pretation is more useful - or, to be vulgar, simply better-than 
another. 
Miller presents an altogether different historiographical con­
cern. He explicitly raises no questions of historical method or inter­
pretation. Like Rabban, however, he has visited original materials 
and told us an important story. Unlike Rabban, however, Miller 
seeks a popular and not an academic audience. (By further con­
trast, much of what Rabban has written was published during the 
1980s and 1990s in law review articles (p. x n.4).) Moreover, 
Miller's work is dotted with explicit references to moral and polit­
ical difficulties that have confronted the United States in the past 
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few decades, notably the civil rights movement51 and the Vietnam 
War,52 and he makes explicit his analogies in both the political and 
moral contexts.53 He overtly seeks a certain kind of meaning -
inspiration and moral reflection - by historical analogy.54 Histori­
cal analogy, however, is problematic both as a matter of interpreta­
tion, as Fischer has noted,55 and as a guide to thinking about 
present-day concerns, as Ernest May has demonstrated.56 
Nonetheless, in seeking to identify both heroes and villains and 
to draw lessons from their conduct, Miller revives the oldest of 
American historical traditions. Before history became the province 
of academics and history departments came under the sway of Ger­
man-trained historians (who viewed historical study as a science), 
American history was a literary endeavor, and the stories were con­
trived to inspire and to teach, above all to teach moral lessons, usu­
ally ones applicable to the polity as a whole. One eventual 
consequence of the introduction of Germanic scientism was the de­
cline of history as literature. The rise of scientism also led to spe­
cialization, and with specialization came studies that separated the 
American polity into classes, factions, and interest groups. Histori­
ans who claimed that America was, as a polity, committed to an 
overarching political ideal, or even a group of political ideas, over 
time came in for enormous criticism and even contempt. With the 
demise of the "consensus school" of history in the 1960s and 1970s, 
the serious attempt to generalize about nationally unifying political 
themes was virtually abandoned.s1 
What is striking about both works is their quiet revival of the 
notion of a polity committed to a political ideal.58 Unlike, say, the 
American liberal tradition in the grand and subtly tragic vision of 
Louis Hartz,59 Rabban and Miller do not envision an ideologically 
cramped polity, cosseted by history. Rather, each sees a polity 
committed to a particular manifestation of a political ideal at some 
general level. This ideal is roundly compromised in fact but, despite 
the compromise, returns to live another day. This ideal is, in both 
51. See, e.g., pp. 74, 78, 82. 
52. See, e.g., pp. 316, 375. 
53. See, e.g., p. 3. 
54. See, e.g., p. 504. 
55. See FISCHER, supra note 49, at 243-59. 
56. See ERNEST R. MAY, "LESSONS" OF THE PAST: THE UsE AND M1susE OF HISTORY IN 
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1973). 
57. See MORTON J. HORWTIZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: 
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 251-52, 257-58 (1992). 
58. See, e.g., Miller pp. 22-24; Rabban p. 13. 
59. See Louis HAR1Z, THE LIBERAL TRADmoN IN AMERICA: AN INTERPRETATION OF 
AMERICAN PoLmCAL THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION (1955). 
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cases, one of expression and its capacity to structure the nation's 
social culture and political life. 
One of the grand themes of the old morally didactic style of 
history as literature was the strength and uniqueness of liberty in 
America. America was morally superior to Europe's corrupt and 
decadent societies, and the histories celebrated that difference. By 
the late 1960s and certainly by the 1970s such celebratory views 
were thoroughly in disrepute, and historians emphasized conflict 
and social history. The historians emphasized social context even in 
political and intellectual history, and within social context the myr­
iad groups that formed America jockeying for position in society. 
Gone from the story along with triumphalism were ideals or polit­
ical themes that knit the country together. Moreover, historians 
had begun to give us subtler accounts of American debts, political 
and otherwise, to England and continental Europe. In these stories 
the theme of freedom and liberty was sometimes slighted or forgot­
ten, sometimes told from its darker side, or displaced by the tale of 
the rise of liberalism from its ideological forebears, such as 
republicanism. 
Rabban and Miller, however, refocus our attention on the 
theme of liberty and freedom but without the self-congratulatory 
tone of earlier writers. Instead they tell us about conflicts within 
the larger theme, the struggle and compromises, the political and 
intellectual tactics, and, to some degree at least, the social context 
of freedom and liberty. In doing so they have begun a difficult task, 
one that differs from the tasks undertaken by previous historians. 
Whereas the triumphal style took freedom and liberty as both given 
and good, and whereas a more modem school took a degree of 
freedom for granted and either slighted its impact or told tales of its 
dark side, Rabban and Miller have undertaken to explain why and 
how people involved in the conflicts so dear to modem historians 
valued such freedom and liberty, and to describe the efforts made 
on behalf of an abstraction and the compromises made in its name. 
They put flesh, not simply words, to belief systems of individuals, 
groups, and, ultimately, American society as a whole. These are, 
then, works which should assist historians, not just in their particu­
lar contributions, but for the larger theme of which the works are 
emblematic. Both authors have given life to the history of constitu­
tional institutions, and we are enormously in their debt for their 
efforts. 
OMISSIONS 
One of the stocks-in-trade of book reviewers is to say that it is 
not their job to criticize one author for writing the book the re­
viewer wished the author had written, and then to make such criti-
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cisms anyway. I will not bother to deny that I am about to engage 
in such a paralepsis. 
Miller, having drawn our attention to what he rightly notes is a 
neglected episode in American history and having thereby illumi­
nated the use of a nearly invisible constitutional institution, tells us 
far too little about the institution of the petition itself. He wants to 
tell a story about heroic opposition to slavery, and the gag-rule is 
his vehicle. While he thereby materially enriches public under­
standing of the right to petition as well as of antislavery, Miller 
would have profited by a richer historical explanation of the peti­
tioning the Quakers and other abolitionists undertook. The gag­
rule is not just an episode in antislavery, of course, but is also an 
episode in the history of petitioning. 
I have already suggested that this inattention renders Adams's 
opposition to the gag-rule a historical curiosity. If Miller had better 
explained the institution itself, he would have situated Adams as 
simply the last of a school who regarded petition as the core form of 
political communication with governmental institutions and person­
nel. 60 The advent of sophisticated communication and transporta­
tion systems, the vehicles of centralized political parties, the 
explosion of printed media, and, above all, the growth of the 
franchise itself, had rendered petitions and petitioning less impor­
tant. 61 Adams was thus not quixotic, but old-fashioned. 
Similarly, the petitioning by women and others was not really 
unprecedented, as Miller seems to suggest, in the nineteenth cen­
tury62 or even earlier.63 The scale of their participation, however, 
was. Moreover, at least some of the women tapped into a long tra­
dition of participation by petition and were far from shy about their 
political sentiments in conducting the petition campaign. As Lydia 
Maria Child noted, for example, "[t]he fact is, you cannot raise a 
solid anti-slavery structure upon an aristocratic ground-work. 
There is no moral cement by which the two things can be held to­
gether. "64 Such women were not, as Miller puts it, "a powerless 
and marginal handful of practitioners of a new sort of reform" (p. 
65). Marginal they were, but powerless, no. The indication of the 
60. See Mark, supra note 5, at 2223, 2225. 
61. See id. at 2226-2228, 2230. 
62. See Loru D. GINZBURG, WOMEN AND TIIB WoRIC OF BENEVOLENCE: MoRALITY, 
PoLmcs, AND CLAss IN TIIB NINETEENTII-CENruRY UNITED STATES (1990). 
63. See Mark, supra note 5, at 2182-85. 
64. Lydia Maria Child to Ellis Gray Loring, August 16, 1838, Ellis Gray Loring papers, 
1828-1919, Box 2, folder 122, Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe College, Harvard University. See 
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threat they posed was the venom with which they were attacked. 
Moreover, as moral and political agents, they acted with the consti­
tutional tool available to them, a tool of significant historical power. 
Miller's story would thus have been materially and subtly en­
riched if he had described petition as a constitutional vehicle in 
eclipse. The petitioners would have been paid more attention in a 
different political culture. The petition campaign itself, the peti­
tions circulated, and the understanding of the political obligations 
of the House would all have been different in a different era. Such 
an era was within living memory, indeed was within the memory of 
John Quincy Adams. Failure to provide the details of petition's 
constitutional role weakens Miller's story. It does not detract from 
the heroism of Adams and Miller's other champions, but their stat­
ure, and that of the petitioners themselves, especially the women, 
would have been different had Miller incorporated a richer under­
standing of the institution they put in service of their beliefs, both 
antislavery and pro-petition. 
Similarly, for all its breadth and profound revisionism, Rabban's 
story would have been richer had he been able to focus more of his 
attention on the debate about free speech within the executive 
branch and Congress, and among the cultural dissidents themselves. 
In places we are given such context, as in discussions within Con­
gress and the executive about the wisdom, constitutional and other­
wise, in adopting and using the Espionage Act (pp. 248-55). 
Elsewhere such discussions are curiously absent. All the more curi­
ous, since what emerges with crystalline clarity from Rabban's work 
is the judicial hostility to novel claims for free speech. The dissi­
dents to whom he refers, and certainly their lawyers, knew of the 
hostility. Where, then, did their claims come from? Some cultural 
tradition, some institutional embodiment of their claims - claims 
which were made after all, as if they were not novel - had to have 
informed such beliefs. Belief in personal autonomy is one thing. 
Belief that such autonomy is embodied in the Free Speech Clause, 
quite another. My complaint is, however, probably premature. 
Rabban promises to push his revisionism back further (p. 20), and I 
eagerly await that work. 
I freely admit that these criticisms are minor ones. These are 
important books, especially when read together. However difficult 
constitutional lawyers and some historians find assimilating these 
works, all will benefit from the ways in which they expand our legal 
and historical imaginations. They suggest, at a minimum, that we 
should not, either as lawyers or historians, think that only courts 
and grand thinkers add to our understanding of constitutional 
meaning. They suggest that we should revisit the clauses of the 
Constitution which today are dormant, not simply to uncover their 
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history and to give a richer picture of the constitutional whole, but 
to suggest ways in which, in an altered political culture and an alto­
gether different physical and social context, these dormant clauses 
may embody values we have engrafted onto other clauses today. 
Finally, of course, they counsel caution in accepting received wis­
dom wholesale. Constitutional meaning is, after all, a cultural prod­
uct, the contextual production of which merits our close attention. 
